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I. Introduction: Asylum Politics and Greek-Albanian Relation
The connection between asylum policy and international relations is often 
disregarded as ‘just obvious.’  Also, the logic of asylum is sometimes recognized 
in a limited context of the international relations in the past, when only ‘political’ 
refugees mattered, in which they were considered only in respect of their role as 
a bargaining chip between the states concerned.
 The politics of asylum, in reality, has not always been so blatant. Asylum 
is offered, in general, as a result of complex political judgments from the 
competent authority (sometimes, authorities), over the careful thought including 
consideration as to whether this state act creates an undesirable relation with the 
country where the relevant individual fled from. The decision making is often 
difficult because it comes along with the complexity. Here, the complexity does 
not only mean that disorder is brought about by the involvement of various 
relevant ministries and agencies in the decision making processes, but also 
means that the ‘causal link’, between government decision (of offering asylum) 
and its reflection to the country the asylum-seeker comes from, is not given from 
the beginning but is only predictable. There is an absolute lack of information in 
this phase of asylum decision. In this sense, the politics of asylum may well be 
deemed as an aspect of high politics in international relations. 
 Political tactics also need to be included when considering asylum politics. 
In the state of war, for larger sphere of influence against each other, the asylum 
offering by the state, as an effective card in the diplomacy, works gained powers 
Balancing Immigration and 
Security Concerns
   – the case of Greece –
Midori Okabe*
*Academic Programme Associate, Peace and Governance Programme, United Nations University, Tokyo. 
『社会科学ジャーナル』54  COE特別号〔2005〕
The Journal of Social Science 54  COE Special Edition [2005] 
pp.27-48
28 29
Balancing Immigration and Security Concerns 
and firmer defense to a country. Especially, when ethnicity or nationality is in 
question, the conflicts over greater territory are combined with resistance or 
partisan movements on the grassroots level, for which the act of asylum means 
the state’s protection of her ‘nationals’ . 
However, when the war becomes ‘severe,’ at some point the leaders of 
countries consider the act of asylum itself as useless, since the battle over 
territories has at this stage turned out to be more direct and straightforward; the 
intention of the state becomes more focused on getting the larger territory as her 
own than receiving her ‘nationals’ into her territory in existence. Asylum politics 
therefore produces the most significant effect when the two countries in conflict 
still maintain the minimum balance of power, and have the intention to use 
asylum policy as a means to render psychological damage to their enemy. 
Looking from a different angle, we also recognize that asylum politics stop 
exerting any positive effect to the countries which are ‘not’ in the state of war, 
be it literal or indirect. Very often, the involvement of countries in the asylum 
act, which desire to keep the harmonious relations, can be detrimental to peace 
maintained so far. A country in a very fragile position in terms of the balance of 
power with another country, which happens to be her neighbor, and when she 
needs to keep the balance just as it is, therefore tends to remain silent when the 
entry of a foreigner could be recognized as an asylum case.
As the increased international human flow through various channels has 
been evident in the world since the 1980s, asylum has been regarded in a 
different context for those seeking an alternative understanding. In most cases, 
it is ‘apolitically’ interpreted. For them, asylum is merely one of the options 
for their ’survival’, lying ahead of them. Nowadays, those who wish to migrate 
will do so in any case. From their logic, asylum means a philanthropic measure 
offered unilaterally from the state. The possible change in the mutual balance 
between the two relevant countries is not always fully taken care of. 
The problem shared by most migrant-receiving countries today, where, 
in most cases, the number of asylum appeals has been dramatically increased 
over decades, is that the conventional logic of asylum, as is described above, 
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is no longer adequate and may already be obsolete, to fully tackle the current 
influx of asylum appeals. This does not mean, however, that a country like 
Greece, where the conventional asylum policy has been non-existent, or unseen, 
can suddenly establish ‘contemporary’ policy in this regards by ignoring all 
historical background with relations to other countries.    Although Greece has 
turned into a migrants-receiving country from a migrants-sending country, as 
some other countries on the globe, the course towards adopting sound political 
measures will and should vary, according to the historical past, discipline(s) in 
high politics, and overall direction in the running of each country.
In this light, this paper will address how asylum policy is shaped in a country 
like Greece, where the policy has almost been non-existent until quite recently, 
and which experienced war(s), cease-fire, and the rehabilitation of friendship 
with her former enemy through (economic as well as political) cooperation. 
The Greek-Albanian relation is examined here as a most relevant and 
interesting instance, since we will find how intriguingly high political relations 
can affect the outline and the dynamism of asylum policy making, which might 
not be so evident in other migrant-receiving countries in Europe today. The two 
countries had long been in conflict up until 1987, and the human flows between 
the two countries, already during the mid-1980s, were not evidently exposed 
as that of ‘asylum-seekers,’ partly because the people who move did not make 
an appeal, also because the Greek government approved a set percentage of 
Albanian refugees of ‘Albanian’ national /cultural background.   
This paper will try to analyze the developments seen in migration (including 
asylum) policy making in Greece, by exploring the historical background of 
disturbance the two countries had suffered from during and after the W.W. II. To 
my understanding, this historical context  had molded the bases of Greek policy 
as is seen today, which is often criticized as flawed in terms of human rights, as 
well as being a little rather unsophisticated.             
The absence of migration/asylum policies which satisfactory meet the 
present necessity both of foreign as well as “national” residents in Greece is 
rooted in complex backgrounds. The notorious and thus disgraceful reputation 
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of Greece in this regards is that the administrative body as well as the whole 
legal and political system violates human rights of the foreign residents, whether 
or not they possess legal status. The European Court of Human Rights recently 
condemned Greece for the “inhumane and humiliating treatment” of a Syrian 
refugee in 2001, which had unveiled how poor the asylum-seekers are treated 
in Greek detention center to the whole EU states (Samatas, 2003). Besides, the 
imperfect and inefficient performance on the side of the civil service regarding 
immigration control is often pointed out, which is, though, in part, a little more 
difficult that it at first appears to be when we think of the very complicated 
geographical features of the country, with over 100 border crossing points both 
at mountains and by the sea (Samatas, 2003).
Other claim is vested on the Greek backwardness to provide for sufficient 
legal /political measures, although the immigration as phenomenon had been 
familiar way before W.W. II, while the EU member states in the north have 
experienced it since 1945. It is often attributed to the Greek indefference and 
even  unwillingness to asylum/refugee protection as well as immigrant reception 
until quite recent times (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997). 
All three points, the rough treatment of “Aliens” in terms of human rights, 
the malfunctioning of the national/local administrative body, and the overall 
apathy towards migrants ensued until quite recently, can be critical factors 
which depict the inconsistency found in Greek immigration policy of today. This 
paper will explore more in depth; by trying to depict international relations as a 
historical background which might have enabled the aforementioned three points 
to be realized. Bearing this in mind, I will first describe a little introduction 
of the vulnerable picture of the region detected in the Balkans, with Greece in 
the centre. As was mentioned earlier, the high political international relations, 
especially during and after, or even before the Cold War, often have vital impacts 
on migration control of a state. Greece is, among others, a country which is 
particularly sensitive to global instability during the Cold War period, and has 
been tossed about by waves of power games which had taken place both among 
the (then) great powers as well as on the regional level, which might result in the 
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regional battle for territorial expansion in the Balkan. In this context, a Greek 
case can well be inspected by looking at Greek-Albanian relations, where the 
‘national’ relations were reflected by and large in the migration policies of the 
two countries.
II. Migration to Greece
Until quite recently, Greece had experienced  more  emigration than 
immigration. There are some 6 million Greek nations living abroad according 
to OECD (SOPEMI, 2003). In the 1990s, like other south European countries, 
Greece has become characterized as an immigrants-receiving country. The 
rapid economic growth along with the drastic reform of economic structure, 
with efforts to meet the fiscal criteria set by the (then) European Community for 
membership, needed a huge amount of labor force. The change had attracted 
cheaper labors even from outside of the domestic market. Today, the foreign 
population, including illegal immigrants, is estimated to be 7.5-9.5% of the total 
population (SOPEMI, 2003). Apart from the retired people of Greek origin who 
return from U.S. or Canada (so-called “repatriates”), most of the immigrants 
come from the Balkan region. 
Among them, the Albanians are worth noting. Currently, over 200,000 
Albanians reside in Greece, succeeded by Poles, Philippines/ Thais, Bulgarians, 
etc (see Table 1.). A more recent study indicates that the outstanding dominance 
of Albanians amounts up to approximately as much as 65% (Fakiolas, 2003).
Most Albanians came to Greece, if not to Italy, neither through formal 
asylum procedure nor as legally authorized economic migrants, but by using the 
illegal channel in the way being smuggled into the black labor market. Table 2 
and 3 show how few Albanians use the formal channel of asylum appeal for their 
entry into Greece. 
What has driven many Albanians to be illegal migrants? Several explanations 
for this can be found. First, the geographical proximity: the two countries are 
connected by land. Also, combined with the shared historical experience of 
having followed the common masteries, from ancient Greek era up to the time 
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of the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks and the Albanians have many things alike in 
culture. In addition, inter-marriage has surely taken place over the long history, 
hence ethnic and cultural assimilation had developed accordingly. Although this 
“proximity” has become one of the major triggers for the conflict that has not 
yet abated in the region (which I will come back to explore later), it helped the 
Albanians to think of Greece as their major destination. In most cases, according 
to their minds, they do not even think they need to make official appeals (either 
politically or economically) to the Greek authority for the permission to enter, 
because they are Greek, or akin to Greek, when you get right down to it. 
Table 1. Immigrant/ Refugee Population in Greece
Place of origin Estimated number Residential area
Albania 200,000 - 250,000 Metropolitan area of Athens
Other regions of Greece
Bulgaria 7,000 - 8,000 North Greece – Athens
Ex-U.S.S.R. (Pontians*) Up to 50,000 Macedonia – Athens
Poland Up to 100,000 Macedonia – Athens
Russia – Ukraine Up to 50,000 Salonica – Athens
Kurdistan (Iraq, Turkey) Up to 10,000 Patras – Athens
Pakistan 5,000 - 15,000 Athens
Philippine, Thailand 40,000-60,000 Athens
[Psimennos, 1997]
* Pontians, or Pontic Greeks are ethnic Greeks who had returned from regions around the 
Pontic Mountain, but the residents of the CIS (mainly Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). 
Their “repatriation” began remarkable in the late 1980s, marked a peak in 1993 (25,500 
persons returned to Greece), but soon declined to around 4,000 by 1999. Most of them 
are deemed to be settled in the Northern part, e.g. Macedonia or Thrace. (SOPEMI, 2003, 
Psimennos, 2001)
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Table 2. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Greece –Main Nationalities 
(in 2002)
Refugees Asylum-Seekers
Country of Origin Number
Iraq 950
Turkey 629
Iran 392
Afghanistan 137
Lebanon 64
[Extracted from UNHCR, 2002]
 
Table 3. Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Albania –Main 
Countries of Asylum (in 2002) 
Refugees Asylum-Seekers
Asylum Country Number
United States 4,534
Germany 2,073
Canada 1,186
France 869
United Kingdom 615
Others 1,319
Total 10,596
[Extracted from UNHCR, 2002]
Second, as closely interlinked with the first reason, is the political factor. As 
being neighbors, with a shared history of once being parts of a single territory, 
the two nations hold similar landownership problems, to sort out which land 
belongs to whom. The problem is yet to be solved, and in many cases has 
become one of the major causes for the conflicts, some of which are still on-
going. It is said that when the Albanians influx started in 1980s, most of them 
were the Greek-minority residing in northern part of Albania. They sought 
refuge in a real sense, which was by all means acceptable to the Greek authority 
at the time, as they are ethnically Greek, had intention to be settled in Greece, 
Country of Origin Number
Iraq 2,567
Afghanistan 1,238
Iran 411
Pakistan 250
Turkey 211
Asylum Country Number
United States 1,230
United Kingdom 1,150
Canada 569
Belgium 539
France 435
Others 1,697
Total 5,620
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and in practice obtained the Greek nationality after their entry. Soon later, the 
ethnic Albanians followed the  tide. And this time, they were not welcomed by 
the Greek authority, unless they prepared sufficient documents to certificate 
their qualification of entry. Some of them immigrated as labor force, as a status 
officially guaranteed by the bilateral contract between Albania and Greece, but 
others, and most of them, were undocumented sneaked into Greece through 
“informal” national borders as mountains or the sea.
III. Greek migration policy
The Greek migration policy, as a political measure to respond to the recent 
change seen in the trends of inflow/outflow of migration, is mainly characterized 
in two ways. First, it is in the stage of “catching up” with others, that Greece 
has recently become the immigrant–receiving country for about two decades. 
Their membership to the European Union (then European Community) of 
course had an effect for the transformation of Greek legal/political structure 
on the regulation of migration. Second, in the course of its institutionalization, 
Greece has gradually mitigated the distinctive line of Greeks and Aliens. The 
two aspects were interlinked and have thus constituted the Greek legislation and 
policy of the present day, on which I will explore further. 
The origin of the Greek legal measure to deal with (inwards) migration 
[Greece and the surrounding regions]
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can be traced back to 1929. The Law 4310, enacted at that time, first expressly 
stipulated the treatment of ethnic-Greek in the text (article 8.) It is very 
interestingly read from the legislation that the rule of distinguishing “us” from 
“them” is based on ethnic grounds, which facilitates the operation to discern 
“non-Greeks”, but, curiously enough, which is totally powerless to verify “who 
is a Greek.” Psimmenos finely describes this particular aspect of Greek ethno-
centered character found in the legislation, as follows:
….Law 4310/1929 defined as a non-Greek any person who has proved to 
the authorities that he/she is ‘not’ (article 8). The above mentioned law has 
followed an ethnically centred approach to assimilate the then groups of 
refugees that arrived in the country during the Balkan wars (Poulopoulou 
1986), from Asia Minor (Poulton 1991), and from Egypt and the Maghreb 
countries, during the 1950’s (Kassimati 1999). On the other hand, the 
definition of who was a Greek of Greek origins [sic], was not defined and 
it was left to authorities to decide upon the matter…..[I]mmigration Law 
4310/1929 saw migrants as either considered to be of Greek origin or as 
migrants who belonged to a different nationality and were considered to be 
Alien. (Psimmenos, 2001)
 
The law was amended in 1991 (Law 1975/1991), and this time, the 
opportunity was not yet offered to those who reside in Greece and are neither 
of Greek origin nor even political refugees, to obtain Greek nationalities. 
Psimmenos explains the objective of this legislation by citing the words of 
Triandafyllidou, as the intention of Greece was more to facilitate the expulsion 
of illegal immigrants and strengthen tighter immigration control on the border, 
in order to keep pace with European integration in terms of establishing the 
European (or Schengen) area of free movement with stricter controls against its 
external world. Greece was then a co-signatory of the 1990 Dublin Convention 
(ratified by Greece in Law 1996/1991) and of the 1990 Schengen Treaty, to 
which she was first given merely an observer status. The law had enabled Greek 
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authority, not only the national government but also the local police and other 
jurisdictions, to expel as much as 125 million foreigners who illegally resided in 
Greece at that time (Psimmenos, 2001), and there was no sign seen until 1995 to 
recognize the status of non-Greeks by setting up substantive enactments.
 After the Greek government gradually reacted to the societal needs 
to legalize the de facto immigrants’ status in winter 1995, a new law (Law 
2434/1996) was laid down the following year, which sufficed the need to 
a certain extent (Papantoniou- Frangouli and Leventi, 1999). In fact, Law 
2434/1996 requested the making of the Presidential Decree(s) to put the 
regularization procedure into practice, and the two Presidential Decrees 
(358/1997, 59/1997) had been thus followed, after a series of jumbling periods 
towards the promulgation. 
 The two decrees first offered the opportunity to non-Greek residents, 
who are neither ethnic-Greeks nor asylum-seekers/refugees, to obtain a legal 
justification to live and work in Greece, even though on a temporary basis. The 
decision in practice, however, has been commanded on a case-by-case basis 
by the competent authorities, including the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of 
Public Order, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with local institutions. 
 The so-called “regularization” process had thus been implemented, and 
the measure had been reinforced by the second regularization executed in 2001, 
according to the renewed Aliens Law of 2910/2001 (Fakiolas, 2003).
The purpose of regularization, in principle, is to give illegal migrants the 
right to reside legally in the host country. Another purpose, in most cases not 
openly stated but tacitly understood, is to facilitate the administrative task to 
grasp how large the illegal population the country holds at the moment; in the 
regularization programme, the illegal migrants are expected to show up and 
make appeals to the authority for legal permits. Since the latter aspect, that is, 
the (hidden) intention on the administrative side is already seen by the illegal 
migrants, and they know that not all applicants to this programme will be given 
the “Green cards,” they tend to be reluctant to comply with the government’s 
request, for fear of failing to obtain the legal status and thus being deported to 
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their homelands. In the Greek case, less than 50% applied for registration for the 
first regularization procedure, and over 50% for the second, slightly increased 
because of the simplification of the application procedure for the latter. It is 
estimated that only approximately 10% of the applicants have achieved the legal 
status at each phase (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi, 1999, Fakiolas, 2003). 
The legal measure as above is therefore not highly appreciated as an 
effective tool. It is often criticized so from the international institution (as 
OECD), and sometimes it is recognized even by the civil servants themselves. 
Still, a country where the legal structure is not fully matured to satisfy the 
societal balance of integrating and deporting foreigners, in comparison to the 
factual situation she faces, sometimes deliberately leaves the undocumented 
and unauthorized people live in the country for a while. The regularization 
works as a makeshift in such a country, although she needs serious surgery soon 
afterwards, otherwise she will not survive. But why could not a certain country 
avoid the regularization procedure? Was it deliberate or not that Greece did not 
prepare the systematized asylum and immigration policy until recently? If it was, 
then, why did Greece have to tread the thorny path in the first place? 
VI. Greek –Albanian Relation since WWII 
The Greek-Albanian relation is roughly described as a series of conflicts. 
The conflicts have been a part of a contest over the territorial demarcation within 
the Balkan region, as G. Xhudo states that “[t]he Balkans have, throughout the 
area’s history, been plagued by protracted warfare, shifting borders, irredentist 
claims, and drives for territory, often at a neighbor’s expense” (Xhudo, 1995). 
Often, it is deemed as a part of the “West” because of the tie it has with NATO 
and EU, Greece is expected to play a leading role for the stability of the whole 
region by U.S. and by U.N. The expectation is frequently given away by 
ceaseless friction between Greece and Albania, even after the collapse of former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, when the expectation from the ‘West’ marked 
a peak. The antagonism is rooted because of the history, partially primordial 
desired struggle over who was to have the territory in the region, and gradually, 
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in line with the imminent threat of communism, in the plot of the colonial and 
post-colonial major powers as to who is to protect Greece and draw profits from 
it as much as possible, and of increasing its power by controlling Greece (and 
Albania). In other words, the major powers, namely Great Britain, Italy and 
Germany, and then U.S. and the former U.S.S.R., capitalized on the regional 
dispute between Greece and Albania over territory, which had lasted since the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and their involvement has so far made the 
Greek- Albanian relations more complex than ever, which has had ominous 
implications on the migration issue. 
The Greek-Albanian dispute developed during the W.W. II, when Greece 
was apparently, but in a very fragile way, supported by Great Britain. Britain, 
who placed a lot of emphasis on achieving the military base on the strategically 
important point on the coast of the Eastern Mediterranean, the place where she 
perhaps also believes she shares a cultural heritage, had dismissed Albania to 
be occupied by Italy, then by Germany, and finally by the Communist regime. 
Kuniholm eloquently describes the British intention towards Greece, which had 
also been threatened by Italy, Germany, and by the Soviet regime during the W.W. 
II, as follows;
….As far as the British were concerned, the forces of war reaffirmed the 
value of securing sea communications in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, 
as the war progressed, as the German Army began to fall back, and as 
the Red Army pushed inexorably westward, the British transferred their 
preoccupations from German back to Russian intentions in the area. The 
safeguarding of Britain’s imperial lifeline in the Mediterranean remained an 
axiom of her strategic thinking (Kuniholm, 1980).
In contrast with the British keenness towards Greece, the Britain assigned 
modest importance to Albania. After her independence in 1912, with the 
confirmation of its border having been made in 1921 as is recognized today 
(Martin, Martin and Pastore, 2002), Albania has suffered from instability 
brought on both from inside and from outside; the demographical structure of the 
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inhabitants were multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multinational. According to 
Martin, as of 1921, the majority was Muslim (about 70%), and the minority were 
dominated by Greek-Orthodoxies and Roman-Catholics (ibid.). Although the 
religious diversity did not turn out to be an evident obstacle for the maintenance 
of a national bond, it worked at least as a discreet catalyst to the constant 
vulnerability of society. The outside world, though did not dare to capture the 
national territory any more, the great amount of which had already been taken 
away, had stopped posing using its influence, as it saw that Albania was no more 
useful as a card for the counteracting games among the Powers. 
 The Greek-Albanian relation became tenser with the increased complexity, 
involved by the “third country”, very often such major powers as Great Britain, 
U.S, U.S.S.R and even China. In most cases their involvement was direct to 
the region of dispute, but there were also times when the conflict between 
communist and anti-communist regime had a tremendous impact on the course 
of Greek foreign policy.
 In general, the Balkans on the Eastern Mediterranean, including Greece, 
has long been one of the primary concerns for the Great Powers over centuries. 
In particular, during and after the WWII, the British tactics for the balancing of 
power, along with the uprising of the Soviet communist regime and its growing 
broadness towards dilation of its territory, had exposed the increased disorder in 
this region, and this created a negative impact to the Greek-Albanian relation.    
 The rise of the communist regime had brought about a huge concern to the 
West especially in the early 1940s, especially after the Axis (Italy and Germany), 
and in part the British failure (to Greece) and unwillingness (to Albania) of the 
occupation in the region created a high level of disorder and disruption taken 
over, in Greek case, soon after its liberation in October 1944, and in Albania, 
starting already from a few years earlier, when Italian invasion to the country 
was implicitly recognized by Britain as fait accompli in 1936. Soon afterwards, 
Albania was almost taken to the Communist camp, and in Greece, the communist 
movement began gaining a civil support. Greek communism, represented by the 
Greek Communist Party (KKE), gained special support from citizens for its role 
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in the resistance (Kuniholm, 1980). 
 As the way of commitment of each major power differed, which was most 
discernable in the attitudes of U.K. and U.S. since the end of WWII, Greek 
society became further divided. A ‘schism’ (Kuniholm, ibid.) developed within 
the society and prevented the Creation of the “Greek national” along with the 
territorial line and cast away the national and ethnic questions on the border. In 
other words, while Greece was politically divided into pieces and each of them 
strengthened the tie with its supporter (the Great Britain, U.S.S.R., U.S.A.), the 
society as a whole was hurled into chaos, which soon evolved into a civil conflict 
during the latter half of 1940s. The aftermath was a ‘pat and neat’ conflict 
resolution by the Powers on the surface, with a real quagmire at the bottom 
which would jeopardize the ‘peaceful’ situation at any moment. 
V. Greek Immigration Policy as a Balancing Act 
One of the concrete flashpoints of Greek-Albanian struggle was the 
territorial question; of whether ‘the Great Albania’ or ‘the Greece with Northern 
Epirus’ was realized. 
 In fact, the Northern Epirus has experienced an agonizing history over 
decades. After the German invasion, already in 1942, the region was suffered 
from the quadruple occupation by Germany, Italy, Albania and Bulgaria 
(Macedonia). The resistance began, in the form of nationalist rebellion, and very 
often mixed with communist partisans, which had resulted in the worst disaster. 
The outcomes were just lingering disputes and irredentist movements of the 
inhabitants as are witnessed even today. The memory of massacre, sometimes 
exaggerated as ‘genocide’, of Greek nationals by Albania has frequently been 
used by Greek radical nationalists (Wall Street Journal Europe, Sep. 13, 1994a), 
although the contrary case, that is, the inhumane action taken by Greece to the 
Albanian citizens (including refugees) holds more attention by the world (Wall 
Street Journal Europe, Sep. 13, 1994b), as this often taken the form of accusation 
from U.S., who backs Mr. Berisha, the President of Albania, or by the U.N 
(Xhudo, 1995). 
40 41
Balancing Immigration and Security Concerns 
Below the surface, the conflict between the two countries continued, hidden 
but obstinate, until 1987, when the heads of both countries declared the end of 
‘the State of War’ against each other. Greece, failed to create an opportunity 
to resolve the question of establishing a Greek national identity, as mentioned 
above, it has increasingly been accused by the Western European countries 
for her attitude towards refugees or other foreign nationals. The pressure was 
accepted, since the countries were (and are) adherents to the humanitarianism, 
as well as the members of the (then) European Economic Community (EEC), to 
which Greece had strongest desire to accede.
Apart from the membership to NATO, Greece thought it indispensable to 
be a member of the EEC for her stability in the Balkans. Surrounded by the 
communist countries, in an isolated location not only in terms of military but 
also economy, Greece has sometimes become a target for the economic sabotage 
from the communist world, since the exclusion from the international trade 
network with neighbors meant the gradual decay of the national economy. The 
fragile political situation in the region, with Yugoslav isolation and Bulgarian 
reaction towards Greece in turn, offered no credit to Greece for the stabilized 
regional prosperity that all could enjoy. Greece, then, thought that the EEC, 
although not being a defense provider, ‘could contribute substantially to 
stabilization in the postwar world’ (Hatzivassiliou, 1995).
[Northern Epirus (as of 2004)]
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Albania, on her part, has been way behind in terms of development by the 
time the agreement of the cease-fire was declared, due to the isolationist policy 
taken by Berisha. His calculation and expectation for support from U.S.S.R. 
was betrayed without mercy; moreover, his turning towards China (to form 
a communist alliance) had only brought about a very modest leverage effect. 
Already in the 1980s, many Albanian people had flooded into the neighboring 
countries, mostly to Italy, but also to Greece, and this was the time, in retrospect, 
when Greece needed to change, or even could have changed, the discipline of 
Greek refugee policy.
Looking into the past, the rule of asylum, or refugee concerned with 
how to deal with a person in exile. In most cases, the reason people fled from 
their homelands were political ones at that time. For the states concerned, 
accepting such people as ‘refugees’ meant the official approval that they had 
been persecuted from the state they resided in, which were often regarded as a 
blatant accusation against the state concerned. The more fragile was the bilateral 
relation, the more increasingly was the hatred produced. Thus, the declaration 
of offering asylum to an individual, as long as he/she possesses the nationality 
of a country, so sensitively associated with the way to build up the inter-national 
relation between the two concerned (Honma, 1974).
To Greece, Albania has long been its ‘enemy’ until 1987, when people in 
exile from the country, as long as they were conducive to the Greek society, 
were fairly offered the status of refugee, while the ethnic Albanians and 
often Muslims were the exception, partly because they were considered to be 
dissidents, but also because their reception meant the amicable settlement with 
her enemy country. As mentioned before, already in the 1980s, before the cease-
fire of 1987, Albanians began migrating to Greece. At that time, Greece had no 
aboveboard political means to receive Albanian citizens of ‘Albanian’ ethnic, 
religious, and cultural identity. 
Apart from the inter-national political framework, people started migrating, 
as happened in every parts of the world by that time, not only because of political 
reasons, but also because of economic reasons. The individual motivation let 
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people move even to a country which was in the war with their homeland. As 
the War ends, the situation is now creating pressure on Greece to change the 
jurisprudence in the formation of law regarding the inter-national human flows.
Today numerous approaches to the bilateral and regional cooperation have 
started; many programmes have been launched, sometimes bilateral, in other 
cases in the framework of Europe. Founded by the ‘Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation, Good Neighborliness and Security,’ the two countries promised to 
head for efforts towards confidence-building. In this framework, the two have 
started to increase cooperation in terms of economy, defense, environment, etc. 
to enhance cultural mutual understanding. In this context, the inter-national 
migration between the two countries has, for the first time and at last, been 
understood as a shared problem caused by the structural disparity of wealth (to 
live ‘humanely’ as a human). The ‘migrants’ are no longer ‘pawns’ for the power 
game played by the two countries, but now are recognized as victims produced 
by the two governments’ failure in administration.  
VI. Conclusion – future perspectives after EU Enlargement – 
Greek migration policy is finely constructed in the process where the 
regional dispute, with frequent involvement by the great powers over decades, 
had been settled over a long period. The immatureness of the policy itself has 
been derived, not only from the backwardness for the policy formation and often 
inappropriate treatment on the administrative side, but also from the unprepared-
ness for the altered jurisprudence itself to catch up with the newly born 
cooperation between the two, which had been in a combat situation until 1987. 
Meanwhile, Greek involvement in the European Union (European 
Community at that time) had a tremendous effect in the molding of Greek 
migration policy. For Greece, although it was merely an economic community at 
first, EC placed a lot of importance for the domestic stability in the region even 
in terms of high politics. Albania, on the other hand, which failed to get support 
from the Communist powers over the decades, being geographically isolated 
due to the Tito’s policy, has only been suffered by the economic (and political) 
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exhaustion which made the beeline. 
Until quite recently, the EU has started launching aid projects to Albania, 
and, after the fifth Enlargement, the expectation of Albania to achieve the 
membership by the ‘next’ Enlargement reaches on a highest note. The two 
countries have now shared a common sense of reliability to the EU, not just as 
an economic last resort, but as an indispensable catalyst for the political stability 
in the region. The policy which regulates migratory flows has thus followed the 
course, and in this sense, we can expect the favorable future for both countries, 
although the success has yet to be achieved for the time being.
* For the completion of this article, the auther would like to express her special 
gratitude to Dr. Tatiana Papadopoulou and Mr. Stavros Tsiepas of Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Athens, as well as Dr. Nicholas Sitaropoulos, a legal 
research officer at the National Commision of Greece for Human Rights (as 
of March 2004). The auther would also thankful to the kind assistance from 
the Ministry of Public Order, Greece. The views expressed and mistakes to be 
found in this article, however, are thoroughly those of the author alone, which 
do not reflect any of the institution she belongs to neither.
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安全保障と出入国管理の接近
̶アルバニア系移民に対するギリシャ政策̶
＜　要　約　＞
岡部　みどり
本稿は、主にアルバニア系外国人を対象としたギリシアの移民政策の形成過程に関
する分析である。今日のギリシアにおいては、少なくともアルバニア系外国人のため
の包括的な移民政策はつい最近まで実質的にほぼ存在しなかった。これは、ギリシア
在住のアルバニア人が稀少だからというわけではなく（現在、アルバニア人はギリシ
ア在住外国人の大多数を占めている）、また、彼らの存在が政治的・経済的・社会的
にギリシア国内で問題視されて「いない」から、というわけでも決してない（現在、
アルバニア人のほとんどは不法入国という形で国内に入り込み、多くは違法麻薬の売
買その他闇市場で活動を行っていると言われている）。
　ギリシア移民政策の主な研究は、この原因を、外国人受容に関する国内文化的価値
観に派生する制度上の準備不足だと捉える。ここでは、特に、ギリシアがつい最近ま
でむしろ移民の送出国であったことや、ギリシア社会が、半ば血統主義的な国民規定
意識を共有しつつ、これまで外国人の社会統合を発展付けるような文化的構築を遂げ
てこなかったことが理由とされている。本稿では、これに対して、ギリシアが関わっ
てきた対外関係、とりわけ外交上の二国間（あるいは多国間）関係が、外国籍居住者
の受容及び移民政策の策定に、その基底において重要な影響を与えてきたことを論ず
る。
ギリシア・アルバニア両国は近年（1987年）まで戦争状態にあったが、この時期は、
特に、北エピルス地方を巡る両国間の領土問題が過熱し、このため両国間の人の移動
に関して国家保護の対象となるのは、明らかに「政治的迫害」を受けた（あるいは受
ける恐れがある）と判断されうる、条約が規定するところの通常の「難民」のみであっ
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た。しかし、戦争の終結に近づくにつれ、領土問題は未解決のままであったものの、
両国間の著しい経済格差が明らかになるに伴い、いわゆる「経済難民」と言われるア
ルバニア人が、80年代末既にギリシアに流入し始めた。そして、戦争終結後の今日、
ギリシア国内における「アルバニア人」は、「敵国に帰属する政治的存在」から「貧
しい国から入国し、ギリシア国内労働市場で不法に就労している外国人」と明確に認
識されるようになった。一連の歴史を追った結果、ギリシアの今日の移民政策の「未
熟さ」は、それまで敢えて規定することが出来なかった（政治亡命者以外の）アルバ
ニア人居住者のための法制度作りが、戦争後の両国間の信頼醸成の進展とともに、現
在やっと可能になった段階と解釈することが妥当であろうと考えられる。そして、ギ
リシアにおけるアルバニア人移民のための法基盤の整備は、この歴史的文脈を反映し
た、両国間の政治・経済その他社会的分野における協力の進展だけでなく、スタビラ
イザーとしての EUの役割、また、EUの努力による東地中海地域の政治的安定の確
保が担保されることでますます両国にとって望ましいものに近づいていくだろう。
